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Health Law
Physician Aid in Dying and Assessment of Patient Capacity
Lois A. Weithorn1
Introduction
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may
constitutionally prohibit physicians from providing a lethal
prescription to terminally ill patients who request aid in dying.2
Yet despite their authority to retain the prohibition, nine states
(California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Jersey,
Oregon, Washington, Vermont) and the District of Columbia
permit “physician aid in dying” (“PAD”).3
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act,4 the paradigm PAD statute,
allows a patient diagnosed with a “terminal” (that is, “incurable
and irreversible”) disease, whose life expectancy does not exceed
six months, to request a lethal prescription for self-administration
“for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified
manner.”5 The statute includes a panoply of procedural and
substantive safeguards, seeking to enhance and support patients’
end-of-life choices while protecting them from coercion and
unwise personal decisions. All other U.S. jurisdictions permitting
PAD have closely followed the Oregon model.
One of the most important protections for patients seeking
PAD is the requirement of informed consent. This requirement
seeks to ensure that patients consenting to PAD are fully informed
of their choices, act voluntarily, and are legally competent to
choose. It explicitly prohibits PAD for persons whose
decisionmaking is impaired due to depression or other mental
disorders. This Chapter reviews and interprets PAD provisions

1

Excerpted and adapted from Lois A. Weithorn, Psychological Distress,
Mental Disorder, and Assessment of Decisionmaking Capacity Under
U.S. Medical Aid in Dying Statutes, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 637 (2020).
2
Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997).
3
Weithorn, supra note 1, at 644–46.
4
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897.
5
Id. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805.
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addressing patient competence within the context of applicable
legal doctrine and scientific findings.
Patient Decisionmaking Competence Under PAD Statutes
The doctrine of informed consent establishes individuals’
legal authority to make decisions about their own healthcare.
Underlying and animating the doctrine is respect for autonomy,6
which highlights the values of personal choice and “self-rule that
is free from both controlling interferences by others
and . . . limitations such as inadequate understanding that prevents
meaningful choice.”7 In order to achieve its promise, the doctrine
requires that consent be informed (rendered only after
communication by the healthcare provider of legally required
elements of disclosure),8 that decisions be made voluntarily (free
from coercive or controlling influences)9 and that patients make
the decisions competently (with the capacity to understand and
reason about the information provided).10
Four standards of competence prevail in American law, the
most common one of which is understanding of the information
communicated by the practitioner.11 The other three standards that
appear in statutes or case law focus on patients’ ability to
communicate a choice among the treatment options; ability to
reason about the treatment information provided; and ability to
6

Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55, 58–61 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan
Wertheimer eds. 2010).
7
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 101 (7th ed. 2012).
8
AM. MED. ASS’N CODE OF MED. ETHICS 2.1.1.
9
See Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Robert Klitzman,
Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model, 39
HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 30, 32 (2009); Robert M. Nelson, Tom Beauchamp,
Victoria A. Miller, William Reynolds, Richard F. Ittenbach & Mary
Frances Luce, The Concept of Voluntary Consent, 11 AM. J. BIOETHICS
6 (2011).
10
See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS
AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 31–60 (1998).
11
See Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to
Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1836 tbl.1 (2007).
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appreciate the likely consequences and implications of the
treatment options as applied to the patient’s own condition and
situation.
All PAD statutes require, with fairly consistent criteria, that
practitioners certify that the patient is capable of making
healthcare decisions. Oregon defines decisionmaking capacity as:
“the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to
health care providers.”12 Oregon further specifies that an
“informed decision” is
based on appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully
informed by the attending physician of: (a) His or her medical
diagnosis; (b) His or her prognosis; (c) The potential risks
associated with taking the medication as prescribed; (d) The
probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and
(e) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to,
comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.13

If conditions indicate that the patient may not have decisional
capacity, but the patient still seeks PAD, the physician must refer
the patient to a mental health professional for further assessment
of capacity, with no life-ending drugs provided until that
consultant “determines that the patient is not suffering from a
psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing
impaired judgment.”14 This formulation defines a two-pronged
test: (1) whether the patient is experiencing a disorder or
depression; and (2) whether any such observed disorder or
depression is causing impaired judgment. None of the statutes
makes the presence of a mental disorder dispositive of incapacity;
the disorder or condition also must cause impaired judgment.
“Impaired judgment,” as defined in the Vermont statute, exists

12

OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 1.01(3). Other PAD jurisdictions have
similar definitions. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48–102(10); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.01(2); ME. STAT. § 22-2140(2)(C); N.J. STAT. § 26:16-3;
VT. STAT. § 18-5281(2); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010(3).
13
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(7) (emphasis added). Other PAD
jurisdictions have similar provisions. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 443.1.
14
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 443.1–443.5 (providing similarly).
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when “a person does not sufficiently understand or appreciate the
relevant facts necessary to make an informed decision.”15
The Legal Presumption of Competence
Under modern legal standards, adults are presumed competent
to make treatment decisions, irrespective of a diagnosis of a
mental or physical disorder, and despite the concern that persons
dying from a terminal disease may be prone to depression or other
mental disorders likely to affect their decisional capacity.
In the United States, modern law recognizes “a rebuttable
presumption affecting the burden of proof that all persons have
the capacity to make decisions and to be responsible for their acts
or decisions.”16 This presumption for all persons applies to those
with mental disorders, mental disabilities, or cognitive
impairments.17
The presumption can be overcome not by resort to diagnoses
or labels, but only by a direct criterion-relevant assessment of the
person’s functional abilities.18 Decades of research on the
assessment of treatment-decisionmaking competence have led to
a number of empirically developed assessment guidelines and
tools, such as those developed by the MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study team.19
The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, the seminal
study in the field, compared the decisionmaking competence of
three groups of recently hospitalized patients, using measures that
operationalized the standards of competence defined above. The
15

VT. STAT. § 18-5281(5). Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(i)
(implying a similar definition).
16
THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 392 (2d ed. 2003).
17
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 18–19. Cf. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5331 (“No person may be presumed to be incompetent
because he or she has been evaluated or treated for mental disorder or
chronic alcoholism, regardless of whether such evaluation or treatment
was voluntarily or involuntarily received.”).
18
SCOTT Y. KIM, EVALUATION OF CAPACITY TO CONSENT TO
TREATMENT AND RESEARCH 11 (2010).
19
THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE
ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) (1998); PAUL S.
APPELBAUM & THOMAS GRISSO, MACCAT-T: THE MACARTHUR
COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH (2001).
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patients in the three groups of were diagnosed with schizophrenia
or schizoaffective disorder, major depression, and ischemic heart
disease.20 These patients were compared with a group of healthy
persons from the community. Impairments in performance were
“more pronounced and more consistent across measures for the
schizophrenia patients,” with approximately 25% of the
schizophrenic group scoring in the “impaired” range on each
measure of capacity compared to 5–7% of the heart disease
patients and 2% of the community group. Notably, approximately
50% of the patients with schizophrenia and 75% of the patients
with depression revealed adequate performance across all
competence measures. Adequate performance increased to 75%
and 90% in those two groups, respectively, on the most commonly
used legal standard of competence—understanding.21 Subsequent
studies by other researchers report strikingly consistent results.
The scientific literature reveals that, while chronic psychotic
disorders present a risk of incompetence, “there is tremendous
heterogeneity in that group,” with many such patients performing
quite well on competence measures initially, and others improving
performance with supportive interventions to promote
competence.22 Mild and moderately depressed individuals
generally meet competence standards, as do most severely
depressed persons. These findings underscore the importance of
individualized assessments of patients whose competence is
uncertain, examining those capacities implicated by the legal
standards.
Characteristics and Psychological Functioning of
Patients Seeking PAD
The website of the Health Authority of the State of Oregon
offers the most substantial body of data about the persons who
seek PAD in the United States.23 Data from the other jurisdictions
20

Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and
Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 150 (1995).
21
Id. at 169.
22
KIM, supra note 18, at 45–50.
23
OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT:
2018 DATA SUMMARY 4 (2019).
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authorizing PAD are consistent with those reported by Oregon.
The cumulative 20-year Oregon data reveal that most patients who
have used PAD are age 65 and older (73%) with a median age of
72 years, are White (96%), and have had at least some college
education (73%).24 Most (90%) were enrolled in hospice, and
almost all (99%) were covered by either private or public
insurance. The most common qualifying medical conditions
included cancer (76%), neurological diseases such as amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (11%), cardiac disease (9%); and respiratory
disease (8%). Patient reasons for seeking PAD were primarily
psychological and psychosocial: loss of autonomy (95%),
lessened ability to engage in life activities (95%), and loss of
dignity (79%). Other concerns included loss of control of bodily
functions (56%), possible burdens on family, friends, and
caregivers (52%), worries about inadequate pain control (30%)
and financial implications of treatment (5%). Oregon reports that
5% of the patients who ultimately died from PAD had been
referred for mental health evaluation and found competent by the
consulting mental health professional. Oregon does not report data
on patients who requested PAD but were found not to be
competent after a mental health referral.
According to the scientific literature, persons in the later
stages of terminal disease experience emotional suffering to a
greater extent than do persons in the general population.25 It is
unclear, however, whether those with such serious diseases
experience a higher prevalence of mental disorder. Reported
prevalence of diagnosable mental disorders varies.26 Investigators
24

Id. at 8 tbl.1.
See, e.g., Harvey Max Chochinov, Psychiatry and Terminal Illness, 45
CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 146–48 (2000); Katherine LeMay & Keith
Wilson, Treatment of Existential Distress in Life Threatening Illness: A
Review of Manualized Interventions, 28 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 472,
472 (2008); Wendy G. Lichtenthal, Matthew Nilsson, Baohui Zhang,
Elizabeth D. Trice, David W. Kissane, William Breitbart & Holly G.
Prigerson, Do Rates of Mental Disorders and Existential Distress Among
Advanced Stage Cancer Patients Increase as Death Approaches? 18
PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 50, 54 (2009).
26
See, e.g., Robert L. Fine, Depression, Anxiety, and Delirium in the
Terminally Ill Patient, 14 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROC. 130, 130 (2001)
(citing reports of incidence of major depression in terminally ill patients
ranging from 25% to 77%).
25
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report challenges of distinguishing between the presence of a
mental disorder and the psychological distress attendant to the
grief, loss, and suffering that often accompanies the dying
process.27 According to some studies, a subset of patients who
request and receive PAD appear to their physicians to be
depressed or to meet certain clinical criteria of depression.
“[P]hysicians may reason that it is normal to be depressed or may
be unable to distinguish depression from sadness under
circumstances of terminal illness.” Or physicians may believe
“that depression was not interfering with decisional capacity and
was not the primary reason for the request.”28 Clearly, criterionrelevant assessments of decisionmaking capacity are necessary to
ensure that depressive, or any other psychological, symptoms do
not impair decisional competence, regardless of the source of
those symptoms.
Distinguishing Choosing PAD from a
Desire to Commit Suicide
The term “physician assisted suicide,” used by some to refer
to PAD, has been rejected by all PAD jurisdictions. Mental health
experts define suicide as a form of self-destruction of a life that
was not otherwise ending. Experts note that suicide is frequently
a manifestation of psychopathology.29 By contrast, PAD assists
patients in exerting some measure of control over the timing and
manner of an already-impending death that will occur within six
months due to a terminal illness. As one team of mental health
professionals puts it: “[S]uicide is defined by the act of intentional
27

Susan D. Block, Assessing and Managing Depression in the
Terminally Ill Patient, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 209, 209–10
(2000); Eric W. Widera & Susan D. Block, Managing Grief and
Depression at the End of Life, 86 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 259, 259 (2012).
28
Diane E. Meier, Carol-Ann Emmons & Ann Litke, Characteristics of
Patients Requesting and Receiving Physician-Assisted Death, 163
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (2003); Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth
R. Goy & Stephen K. Dobscha, Prevalence of Depression and Anxiety
in Patients Requesting Physicians’ Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional
Survey, BMJ, Aug. 2018, at 1.
29
See AM. ASS’N OF SUICIDOLOGY, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY: “SUICIDE” IS NOT THE SAME AS “PAD”
(2017).
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self-inflicted death, [whereas, when patients seek PAD,] the
primary (although not proximal) cause of death is from a
foreseeable underlying terminal illness.”30
Distinguishing between a desire to die grounded in the
psychopathology of depression and a desire to die grounded in
physical, emotional, and spiritual suffering caused by the terminal
illness and impending death can be difficult even for mental health
professionals.31 The legally relevant question, however, is
whether the patient’s treatment decisionmaking capacity is
impaired. A careful criterion-relevant assessment of the
decisionmaking capacity of those persons who are suspected of
manifesting such impairment is needed to separate out those who
do not meet the legal standards of competence set forth in the
governing statutes.
The Possibility of Neurocognitive Impairments in
Patients Seeking PAD
Although the PAD statutes direct attention to mental disorders
and depression, persons who are medically eligible for PAD may
be more likely to experience impairments in decisionmaking
capacity due to neurocognitive limitations. Several factors explain
why this population may be at greater risk than the general
population for neurocognitive impairment.
A recent study estimated the rate of dementia in persons ages
71 and older to be 14%.32 The median age of persons receiving
PAD in Oregon is 72. Persons over age 65 do not necessarily
experience cognitive declines that affect treatment
30

See Dan Nguyen & Joe Yager, PAD: Ethical and Practical Issues for
Psychiatrists, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018). See also John
Michael Bostwick & Lewis M. Cohen, Differentiating Suicide from LifeEnding Acts and End-of-Life Decisions: A Model Based on Chronic
Kidney Disease and Dialysis, 50 PSYCHOSOMATICS 1 (2009).
31
Elizabeth Goy, Linda Ganzini & Tony Farrenkopf, Mental Health
Consultation, in THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2008).
32
B.L. Plassman, K.M. Langa, G.G. Fisher, S.G. Heeringa, D.R. Weir,
M.B. Ofstedal, J.R. Burke, M.D. Hurd, G.G. Potter, W.L. Rodgers, D.C.
Steffens, R.J. Willis & R.B. Wallace, Prevalence of Dementia in the
United States: The Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study, 29
NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 125, 125 (2007).
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decisionmaking, but they experience a higher incidence of
cognitive impairment than do younger persons, and that incidence
increases with age.33 Clinicians tasked with evaluating capacity
under PAD statutes must not, of course, substitute presumptions
related to age or diagnosis of a neurocognitive condition for a
criterion-relevant evaluation of capacity. Stereotypes of the
functional abilities of older persons can and must be avoided. Yet
assessment of treatment competence may be warranted in
individual cases.
A growing body of literature examines the treatment
decisionmaking capacity of older persons.34 Patients diagnosed
with neurocognitive disorders exhibit substantial individual
variability in decisionmaking capacities. Even within the
population of persons diagnosed as having Alzheimer’s Disease,
“there is sufficient heterogeneity such that one cannot simply
equate dementia with incapacity.”35 Research reveals that most
persons with mild dementia meet legal standards of competence,
particularly with additional supports to compensate for areas in
which there may be deficits.
Patients with certain terminal illnesses may be at higher risk
than the general population of experiencing impairments in
cognition.36 Some of these effects may be caused by the progress
of the terminal disease itself, which may interfere with brain
33

María M. Corrada, Ron Brookmeyer, Annlia Paganini-Hill, Daniel
Berlau & Claudia H. Kawas, Dementia Incidence Continues to Increase
with Age in the Oldest Old: The 90+ Study, 67 ANNALS NEUROLOGY
114, 114 (2010).
34
See, e.g., Scott Y.H. Kim, Jason H.T. Karlawish & Eric D. Caine,
Current State of Research on Decision-Making Competence of
Cognitively Impaired Elderly Persons, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 151, 159–60 (2002); Jennifer Moye, Daniel C. Marson &
Barry Edelstein, Assessment of Capacity in an Aging Society, 68 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 158, 158, 167 (2013).
35
KIM, supra note 18, at 42.
36
Moises Gaviria, Neil Pliskin & Adam Kney, Cognitive Impairment in
Patients with Advanced Heart Failure and Its Implications on DecisionMaking Capacity, 17 CONGESTIVE HEART FAILURE 175, 175 (2011);
Brooke Myers Sorger, Barry Rosenfeld, Hayley Pessin, Anne Kosinski
Timm & James Cimino, Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly,
Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 25 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 393, 393
(2007).
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functioning or cause cognitive deterioration. Chemotherapy and
radiation treatments may have a deleterious impact on cognitive
functioning.37 Furthermore, recent studies reveal manifestations
of cognitive impairment in hospice patients where clinical staff
have not diagnosed or treated such conditions.38 Studies using the
MacArthur measures of treatment competence demonstrate
significant variability across hospice patient populations.39
The relationships between cognitive impairment and
treatment decisionmaking in persons at the end of life constitutes
a new area of inquiry, and there remains much to learn. As in the
case of mental disorders, a criterion-relevant, individualized
assessment is essential to determine whether a neurocognitive
limitation impairs treatment decisionmaking capacity. Even
diagnosis of a neurocognitive condition does not necessarily
render an individual unable to meet competence standards. It is
also possible that supportive interventions, such as educational or
pharmacological interventions, may improve decisionmaking
capacity.40

37

J. Cara Pendergrass, Steven D. Targum & John E. Harrison, Cognitive
Impairment Associated with Cancer: A Brief Review, 15 INNOVATIONS
CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 36, 37 (2017); see also Ian F. Tannock, Tim A.
Ahles, Patricia A. Ganz & Fritz S. Van Dam, Cognitive Impairment
Associated with Chemotherapy for Cancer: Report of a Workshop, 22 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2233, 2233 (2004).
38
Cynthia Z. Burton, Elizabeth W. Twamley, Lana C. Lee, Barton W.
Palmer, Dilip V. Heste, Laura B. Dunn & Scott A. Irwin, Undetected
Cognitive Impairment and Decision-Making Capacity in Patients
Receiving Hospice Care, 20 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 306, 306
(2012); S.A. Irwin, C.H. Zurhellen, L.C. Diamond, L.B. Dunn, B.W.
Palmer, D.V. Jeste & E.W. Twamley, Unrecognised Cognitive
Impairment in Hospice Patients: A Pilot Study, 22 PALLIATIVE MED.
842, 842 (2008).
39
Elissa Kolva, Barry Rosenfeld, Robert Brescia & Christopher
Comfort, Assessing Decision-Making Capacity at End of Life, 36 GEN.
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 392 (2014); Elissa Kolva, Barry Rosenfeld &
Rebecca Saracino, Assessing the Decision Making Capacity of
Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 26 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY
523 (2018).
40
See, e.g., Laura B. Dunn & Dilip V. Jeste, Enhancing Informed
Consent
for
Research
and
Treatment,
24
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 595, 595 (2001).
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Emerging Approaches to Evaluating Decisional
Capacity in Patients Seeking PAD
The University of California San Francisco Medical Center
(“UCSFMC”) has developed an evidence-based assessment
protocol to conduct mental health evaluations of persons
requesting lethal prescriptions under California’s End of Life
Option Act.41 UCSFMC requires all patients who seek PAD to be
evaluated by the mental health team even though California law
does not require this step for all patients. UCSFMC made this
policy because of the centrality of this assessment to the statutory
requirements. Five of the first six patients evaluated were
determined to be capable under the statute; the sixth person was
not found to be capable. The authors conclude: “Mild to moderate
depressive disorder typically does not affect cognitive status so
profoundly as to render a patient incapable of decisional capacity,
even for [PAD]. Similarly, mild cognitive impairment . . . may be
compatible with intact decisional capacity for [PAD].”42
Conclusion
In the past fifty years, the law governing patients’ choices
regarding their own medical care has shifted dramatically. Justice
Cardozo’s famous words—“[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body”43—emphasize that the right to make personal
healthcare decisions depends on one’s capacity to make those
choices. Without capacity, the value of autonomy is questionable,
and the state’s interest in protecting those who cannot decide
wisely for themselves outweighs a patient’s right to choose.
Oregon’s experiment with PAD during the past quarter
century, followed by legal reforms in nine other jurisdictions, has
created a framework that promotes patient choice while screening
out patients whose decisional impairments render them
incompetent to choose. Findings from scientific studies suggest
41

James A. Bourgeois et al, Physician-Assisted Death Psychiatric
Assessment: A Standardized Protocol to Conform to the California End
of Life Option Act, 39 PSYCHOSOMATICS 441, 441 (2018).
42
Id. at 449.
43
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
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that most persons seeking PAD will not demonstrate impaired
judgment when evaluated with criterion-relevant capacity
measures. However, further research is needed to better
understand the relationships among decisional capacity and the
range of factors that lead to cognitive challenges in persons who
meet medical eligibility for PAD.
While it is important not to presume incapacity based on the
presence of a mental disorder, psychological symptoms, or
depression, it is also important that the psychological suffering
and mental health challenges of persons requesting PAD be
identified when they exist. To the extent that these experiences
and conditions impair capacity to decide regarding PAD, such
information is relevant to that person’s eligibility under the
statutes. Yet even for persons who meet statutory capacity
requirements (whether or not they meet criteria for diagnosis of a
mental disorder), the PAD request provides an opportunity for
healthcare personnel to offer support and services that might ease
such suffering.

